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6 Technological effort in ndustrial development -
an interpretative survey of recent research*
CARL DAHLMAN and LARRY WESTPHAL
INTRO DUCTION
The exploitation of technological knowledge is central to the development
process. Less-developed economies typically obtain this knowledge from
more advanced ones rather than by creating it themselves. This is to be
expected, given the vast pool of foreign technological knowledge available
to them for exploitation. It does not follow, however, that technological
effort has only a minor role to play in the process of industrial develop-
ment. Such an inference would only be valid if technological effort were
conceived narrowly, as the employment of resources solely for the purpose
of creating new knowledge. In fact, however, resources are also needed for
the task of learning to make effective use of existing knowledge. It is in
this broader and more realistic sense that the term 'technological effort' is
used in this chapter - i.e. as the employment of resources not just to
create technological knoNvledge, but also to master it.
It is worth defining at the outset some items of terminology used in
this chapter. We deiLse technological effort as the use of technological
knowledge together with other resources to assimilate or adapt existing
technology and/or to create new technology. A technology may be defined
as a collection of physical processes which transforms inputs into outputs,
together with the social arrangements (i.e. organisational modes and pro-
cedural methods) which structure tht activities involved in carrying out
these transformations (see Brooks, 1980; Hannay and McGinn, 1980).
Thus technology may be thought of as the translation into practice of
technological knowledge (see Salter, 1960; pp. 13 ff), which we define
as information about physical processes which underlies and is given
operational expression in technology. Finally, technological mastery
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is defined as operational command over technolcgical knowledge. Mastery
manifests itself in the ability to use knowledge effectively, and is achieved
by the application of technological effort. In summary, all four terms may
be dynamically linked as follows: technological mastery is the effective
use of technological knowledge, through continuing technological effort
to assimilate, adapt and/or create technology.
Industrial technology is sometimes misunderstood as being thoroughly
documented in codified form - in 'blueprints', as one prevalent metaphor
would have it. If this simplistic view were valid, technologies could be
transferred and assimilated effortlessly, and a narrow conception of tech-
nological effort would be appropriate. Available evidence, however, belies
this view, in that ostensibly identical technologies are employed with
vastly unequal levels of technical efficiency (or productivity) in different
economies, and even by different firms within a particular one (Leiben-
stein, 1966).
Thus, the shorthand expression 'transfer of technology' is misleading,
to the extent that it suggests that technologies can in fact be transferred
wholesale and in working order. Capital goods can be transferred, but
capital goods alone do not constitute a technology; they represent only
that part of the technology which is embodied in hardware. As noted
above, the remainder is comprised of disembodied technological knowledge
and related social arrangements - and although knowledge can be trans-
ferred, the ability to make effective use of it cannot be. This ability can
only be acquired through indigenous technological effort, leading to tech-
nological mastery through human capital formation.
In this chapter we are primarily concerned with technological effort
and mastery as they relate to physical processes.' It is important to bear
in mind, however, that these physical processes are undertaken within a
framework of social arrangements which condition their operation; it is
sometimes necessary, therefore, to broaden the boundaries of the concept
of mastery to encompass the development of appropriate social arrange-
ments as well. This is particularly true when discussing choice of tech-
nology (see pp. 109-13).
The application of technological knowledge within industry can use-
fully be broken down into four broadly defined categories of activities. In
the order in which mastery is typically thought to be achieved in the
development of particular industrial processes, they are:
production engineering - which relates to the operation of existing
plants;
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project execution - which pertains to the establishment of new pro-
duction capacity;
capital-goods manufacture - which consists of the embodiment of
technological knowledge in physical facilities and equipment;
research and development (R&D) - which consists of specialised
activity to generate new technological knowledge.
More will be said about the acquisition of.mastery in these categories of
activity in later sections of this paper. Several general observations are
none the less in order at this point.
Engaging in any of the first three activities at a given level of mastery
does not involve technological effort. Those carrying out these activities
may, however, find themselves involved in the solution of technical
problems not previously encountered; such problem solving represents an
exercise of technological effort (i.e. the use of technological knowledge to
adapt technology), and may lead to a higher level of mastery. More generally,
technological effort is also used in the assimilation or generation of new
technological knowledge, and hence in the invention of new technologies,
which may either be adaptations of known technologies or radically new
ones. Seen in this light, R&D is merely an extreme case, with respect to its
degree of specialisation, of the acquisition of new technological knowledge. 2
Technological mastery is a relative concept. Thus the extent of a firm's
or an economy's mastery can only be gauged in relation to that of other
entities. Moreover, mastery is not something which can be fully quantified.
For one thing, it is only possible to make unambiguous measurements of
comparative technical efficiency between entities which use ostensibly
identical technologies. But, as we hope to make clear, technological
mastery, even narrowly defined, involves far more than technical effi-
ciency as conventionally understood. For example, an irnportant aspect of
mastery is the ability to adapt technologies so as to make them better
suited to local circumstances - either by altering output characteristics to
reflect local needs and preferences, or by modifying input specifications
to permit the use of locally available materials and resources.
Moreover, even if an entity's overall level of mastery could be measured,
the separate contributions of the various types of mastery - corresponding
to the categories of activity listed above - cannot be, because it is difficult
to be precise about the interrelationships between them. This is particularly
unfortunate, because many of the questions about technological mastery
concern the relative importance of different types of mastery. For example:
Up to what point in a particular industry's development is mastery of
production engineering sufficient? What is the relationship between mastery
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in production engineering and mastery in project execution? Is local
capacity in capital goods manufacturing, or in R&D, necessary before
socially warranted adaptations of tec hnology can be made? These and
similar questions can all be subsumed under a more general one: how
should technological mastery in its various manifestations evolve in
relation to industrial development? In addition to this question, the en-
suing discussion deals with the question of how technological mastery
is acquired.
The discussion is organised as follows. The rest of this section pro-
vides an introduction to the next four sections, which survey the
main areas of past research on the relationship between technology and
industrial development. The survey focusses on those findings which are
of greatest relevance to understanding the acquisition of technological
mastery, and is necessarily brief; thus it does not cover all the findings
that might be relevant in different contexts. The sixth section reviews
the evolution of technological mastery in relation to one country's industrial
development. The case study is of the Republic of Korea, which has been
chosen because of the authors' comparative ignorance of other economies
and - more importantly - because of the interest that attaches to under-
standing the sources of its successful attainment of semi-industrial status.
The concluding section highlights several important issues that have not
yet been given adequate attention in empirical research.
Past research has been prompted less by interest in the acquisition of
technological mastery than by uneasiness about problems associated with
imports of technology - most notably about the failure of the industrial
sector in most developing economies to generate expected levels of employ-
ment (see Eckaus, 1955). The question typically asked in this connection
is whether methods of production developed in capital-abundant, labour-
scarce industrial economies are appropriate for economies with the opposite
relative factor endowments. In addition to addressing this question,
research on choice of technology provides an empirically-grounded under-
standing of technology. For this reason, and because the ability to choose
technology is a critically important aspect of technological mastery, we
begin our survey vith this research.
A central problem in choosing appropriate technologies is the lack
of experience with which decision-takers typically approach the pro-
cess of choice. If choice is to be informed, some prior experience would
appear to be essential, but it is all too often absent; moreover, it appears
that technological mastery in practice is more a function of indigenous
problem solving at the plant level than of acquiring ready-made ex-
perience from abroad. The empirical evidence for local technological
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effort and experience as sources of mastery is discussed in the third
section.
In addition to the problem of appropriate choice, reliance on imported
technology also raises the problem of the ways in which technology
is often transferred. The proposition that foreign technology may some-
times be acquired on terms that are highly unfavourable is well known.
This problem, though important, is touched on only briefly in this paper.
Less extensively studied but gaining increased attention is the near cer-
tainty that some forms of technology transfer have the effect of un-
desirably retarding the development of indigenous technological mastery.
This problem, which is examined in the fourth section, is generally
perceived to be of secondary concern compared to the issue of the undue
capital intensiveness of foreign technology, which is considered to have
an immediate bearing on employment generation. But employment
generation suffers from the capital intensiveness of foreign technologies
only when they are inappropriately chosen.3 The acquisition of increased
technological mastery, on the other hand, is what ultimately underlies the
movement of labour from lower to higher productivity employments.
The effects of technology tranlsfers on the development of local tech-
nological mastery are thus of central concern.
Issues of technological choice, the promotion of indigenous tech-
nological mastery and the need to guard against some of the more damag-
ing effects of certain kinds of technological transfer lead naturally into
consideration cf the part which public policy in developing countries
might appropriately play in this area. The fifth section reviews the avail-
able evidence on various policy approaches adopted by governments, dis-
cussing in particular the relative merits of explicitly interventionist instru-
ments un the one hand, and the promotion of a general climate for in-
dustrial development conducive to purposive technological effort at the
entity level on the other. Finally, the sixth section provides data on
Korean experience and the last section offers some tentative conclusions
and questions for further examination.
CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY
Research on technology choice has first had to ascertain whether there are
in reality any efficient alternatives to the 'best-practice' technologies of
the industrial economies and, indeed, whether there is only one 'best-
practice' technique for any individual activity. 4 ' 5 It is now well established
that there is scope for choosing between techniques with different levels
of labour intensity and productivity, but that the scope for choice is by no
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means uniform. The conventionally accepted method for choosing between
alternative techniques is to evaluate each in terms of its associated benefits
and costs, using shadow prices which properly reflect the relative scarcities
of different factors of production (Sen, 1962). The best (or appropriate)
technique is that which has the highest net benefit.
Where the scope for choice is quite broad (e.g. in textile weaving),
relatively labour-intensive techniques, rather than the current 'best-
practice' techniques of the indus.Lal economies, tend typically to be most
appropriate for developing-country economies.6 These techniques often
represent an older vintage of technological best practice in the industrial
economies. They can frequently be obtained by buying used equipment
which no longer has profitable uses in the industrial economies because of
changing relative factor scarcities. 7 In addition, capital-goods producers
somewhere in the world may continue to embody these older vintages
in new machinery and equipment. Sometimes, however, the best technique
may be one which originated in a developing economy, usually as an
adaption of a former 'best-practice' technique in the industrial economies.
Much less frequently, it may be innovative and radically different from
others currently in use.
For most activities in the majority of industries, no single technique
is best for all circumstances. Local factor endowments and requirements
vary widely - both among different developing economies and between
them and the developed economies. As well as differing significantly in
their relative use of capital and labour, techniques may also exhibit equally
and sometimes more important differences in regard to intermediate
input requirements and joint production possibilities. Thus it is important
to ask whether the techniques actually chosen in particular circumstances
are the appropriate ones. A number of studies have found that they often
are not.
The choice of an appropriate technology depends on the availability
of technological information and on the choice-maker's ability to utilise
the information effectively in making evaluative judgements. Lack of
technological mastery is sometimes wholly responsible for the selection
of inappropriate techniques. The causes generally extend beyond poor
technological mastery, however; institutional behaviour and relationships
often also play a part. Lack of motivation to search for appropriate
alternatives is occasionally to blame. For example, government policies,
such as excessive protection from imports, can effectively destroy rational
incentives for search. Such policies can also induce producers to search for
the wrong kinds of techniques (e.g. when they create artificial distortions
in factor prices). More generally, inappropriate techniques frequently
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result from the absence of incentives for producers to make choices which
are consonant with social objectives. In addition, producers sometimes fail
to respond to price signals, and base their choices on criteria that are
independent of economic forces (Wells, 1973). Finally, it is often not
possible to choose appropriate techniques for activities that produce
related products without giving explicit recognition to the interdependence
between these choices (see Rhee and Westphal, 1979). The way in which
activities are organised among producers affects whether and how such
interdependencies are taken into account and has a major influence on
whether appropriate choices are made.
Past research also suggests that the implementation of appropriate tech-
nology choices often requires complementary investment to enhance local
technological mastery, because technological parameters are highly sensi-
tive to local circumstances and experience-related elements. Technological
parameters for a specific plant should not be confused with 'engineering
norms'. The latter, which serve as points of reference for various modes of
engineering analysis, are values for the former which are valid under an
assumed set of 'standard conditions' for plant establishment, maintenance,
and operation. Depending on whether or not the technology is established
and its use has been widely researched, they may be based on extensive
experience with numerous plants or they may simply be engineering
estimates, based only on theoretical analysis and experimentation within
a controlled environment. In any event, they pertain to conditions, real or
ideal, which generally differ in important respects from the conditions
which confront a specific plant.
A variety of local circumstances can cause plant technological para-
meters to depart from engineering norms. For activities connected with
plant establishment, these sources of variation may comprise the particular
characteristics of the site and the stage of development of local con-
struction and engineering services. For plant maintenance activities, they
include the availability of skilled maintenance workers and the capabilities
of local machine shops to produce replacement parts. For plant operation,
they encompass such factors as the level of labour skills and the character-
istics of the intermediate inputs to be used. Managerial ability affects
virtually all technological parameters.
Many studies of technology choice have been based on engineering
norms, but studies based on actual plant data suggest that factors of
the kind listed above can affect the ope~rational outcome of a particular
choice in extremely important ways. An example taken from a study of the
operation of Korean textile weaving firms (Rhee and Westphal, 1977)
illustrates the point. Based on a careful survey of a number of establishments,
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the average number of semi-automatic looms tended by a single operator
was found to be 5.1, with a standard deviation of 4.0 looms per operator.
Statistical analysis which eliminated the influence of loom and fabric
specific differences indicated that differences in firm-specific characteristics
- that is, in management practices and labour quality - accounted for
variations between establishments which averaged more than 1.5 looms per
operator. The standard deviation of the output per loom in the same
sample was more than 20 per cent of the average output per loom. Thus
differences in firm-specific characteristics alone were estimated to produce
variations which on average were roughly equal to the standard deviation.
The high degree of unexplained variance in the underlying statistical
analysis, which employed standard textile engineering relationships, is
further evidence that the key technological parameters in textile weaving
are far from being universal constants.
In sum, while the parameter values potentially achievable under th'e
best possible conditions may be universally given, the extent to which
these conditions are realised depends upon local circumstances and varies
widely between plants (Leibenstein, 1966). Differences in management
ability and labour quality are of special importance, but other factors
such as differences in available infrastructure (e.g. machinery repair
facilities or the physical properties of available intermediate inputs) may
also significantly affect operational outcomes.
Variations in local circumstances typically affect alternative techniques
in different ways, and may correspondingly affect the appropriateness
of a particular choice. In textile weaving, for instance, the relevant choice
is often between semi-automatic and automatic looms. The former
embody a far more labour-intensive technique - suggesting that they
might be an appropriate choice for a plant in a developing economy. The
two techniques differ in other ways as well, however. For example, the
probability of yarn breakage during weaving is higher with semi-automatic
looms, and the skills of the weavers determine whether yarn breakages
can be repaired without causing imperfections in the cloth. In this respect,
the prevalence of low skill levels would suggest choice of the automatic
technology; indeed, it is sometimes argued that automatic looms are the
appropriate choice in all cases where weavers have not attained exception-
ally high skill levels.8 Similarly, the absence of local machinery repair
and spare-part production facilities - or, more generally, low levels of
technological mastery in these activities - discourages the selection of
older-vintage, more labour-intensive techniques embodied in used equip-
ment for which maintenance services and replacement parts can no longer
be obtained from the original manufacturer.
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Thus, mechanisation - that is, the substitution of capital for labour -
often does permit the substitution of less-highly skilled for more-highly
skilled labour, and smaller-scale and/or more labour-intensive production
methods often do require a larger input of a different type of management
and organisational skills. Nevertheless, to the extent that they can be
changed or offset through investments to upgrade levels of technological
mastery, local circumstances need not impose absolute constraints upon
the adoption of what would otherwise be appropriate techniques. Labour
and management skills can be augmented through investmenzs in human
capital formation; local machinery repair and spare-part production
facilities can be developed. Alternative choices should thus be considered
in conjunction with whatever complementary investments may be desir-
able or necessary for their successful implementation.
In short, social objectives are often best served by choosing techniques
whose input requirements are most nearly in line with relative scarcities
in the economy, supplemented as necessary by complementary invest-
ments to enhance local et-chnological mastery in the relevant sector and
the sectors which provide necessary inputs. This point is forcibly illustrated
by research on the scope for capital-labour substitution in civil con-
struction (Sud et al., 1976). In the first phase of this research, labour-
intensive methods were found to be technically feasible for a wide range
of construction activities, achieving product standards equal to those
of more capital-intensive metlods. They were, however, found to be
economically non-competitive, even at extremely low wage rates. In sub-
sequent phases it was found that traditional methods could be made
economically competitive, even at more reasonable wage rates, by adapting
them through the use of improved tools, proper wage incentives, better
project organisation and more careful work management. It thus proved
possible to make the traditional methods competitive with more recent
capital-intensive methods as a result of an injection of technological
mastery from outside (in the form of the researchers' ability to design
improved tools and to upgrade management practices in the use of the
traditional technology).
EXPERIENCE AS A SOURCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL MASTERY
As the preceding discussion has indicated, technological mastery is not
achieved by passively importing foreign technology. Research on the
transfer of technology, which will be discussed in some detail in the next
section, leads even more directly to the same conclusion. The extent of
indigenous effort required for the successful assimilation of technology
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is most clearly demonstrated, however, by case studies of technological
changes that have occurred over time in individual firms. Much of this
research has been prompted by dissatisfaction with a simplistic view of
technology, which excludes the possibility that indigenous effort directed
towards technological change in less-developed economies is an important
part of 1 e industrialisation process.9 Uneasiness about this view has led
researchc to seek direct evidence of technological effort and change in
the industrial sectors of developing economies, and to develop a more
realistic conception of technological mastery.
The simplistic view holds that technology is something absolute and
static: knowledge of a particular production technology either exists or
it does not. A more realistic perception is that 'manuacturing technology
is characterized by a considerable element of tacitness, difficulties in
imitation and teaching, and uncertainty regarding what modifications will
work and what will not' (Nelson 1979; p. 18). In other words, important
elements of the technology appropriate to a particular situation can be
acquired only through efforts to adapt existing technological knowledge.
Any venture - for instance, the initiation of a new production activity -
requires a great deal of iterative problem solving and experimentation as
the original concept is refined and given practical expression. This sequential
process lasts for as long as changes continue to be made in the operation of
the venture. Research on technological change at the firm level has demon-
strated that this process can continue indefinitely, that it can produce
technological changes which greatly increase productivity, and that it can
yield substantially increased technological mastery.
Dahlman and Fonseca (1978), for example, examined the technological
history of an integrated Brazilian steel producer whose first plant was
established with the help of Japanese steel makers. In order subsequently
to increase the plant's annual production capacity, the firm gradually built
up its technological mastery through a carefully managed process of
selectivity importing technical assistance where needed to supplement of
its own engineering efforts. As a result, the plant's capacity was more than
doubled from its initial nominal rating by means of a sequence of capacity-
stretching technological changes implemented over seven years. Because
these changes required very little additional capital investment and no
additions to the work force, they more than doubled the plant's total
factor productivity. Moreover, as a result of the increased technological
mastery which this process stimulated, the firm was subsequently able
to design and execute further additions to its capacity and to sell technical
assistance to other steel producers, principally in Brazil but elsewhere in
Latin Amnerica as well.
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More generally,firms in less-developed economies have been found to
undertake substantial technological efforts in order to achieve a wide
variety of technological changes.10 These changes include, for example,
stretching the capacity of existing plants through various adaptations
(as in the case just cited), breaking bottlenecks in particular processes
within existing plants, improvirig the use of by-products, extending the life
of equipment, adjusting to change in raw material sources, and altering
the product mix. Some of the firms studied appear to have followed
explicit technological strategies aimed at specific long-term objectives.
Others seem merely to have reacted defensively to changes in their circum-
stances, or to obvious needs to adapt imported technology. On the other
hand, some firms have undertaken no appreciable technological effort and
have consequently experienced no technological change." As yet too few
case studies exist for it to be possible to generalise about what determines
the extent and direction of technological effort by individual firms. Never-
theless, it is apparent that economic forces have an impact, as do character-
istics peculiar to individual firms and types of technology.
Some of the technological changes described in the case studies appear
to be inconsistent with social objectives. For instance, when account is taken
of the effort involved, some capacity-stretching technological changes may
be socially more costly than the alternative of building additional plants.
Teitel (1981) argues that this is true of some of the technological effort
found in case studies of Latin American firms; he further speculates that
this is the result of the inward-looking development strategies and pro-
tectionist policies that have been followed by the countries involved. Most
of the available case studies do not include sufficiently detailed inform-
ation to permit even a partial quantification of the costs and benefits of
the technological changes they describe. It is clear, however, that most of
the Lcfort so far examined has had social benefits in excess of social costs,
even though the extent of the excess is unknown.
Most of the technological changes uncovered in existing research can
be characterised as minor, in the sense that they do not create radically
new technologies but rather adapt existing ones. None the less, as shown
by the example of the Brazilian steel plant, a sequence of minor techno-
logical changes can have a pronounced cumulative effect on productivity.
In fact, the cumulative sequence of zechnological changes following the
initiation of a new activity may have a greater impact on the productivity
of employed resources than that produced by its initial establishment.' 2
This possibility has not - to our knowledge - been explored, but it is
consistent with what has been learned about the process of technological
change in the industrialised countries.
116 Carl Dahlman and Larry Westphal
Studies of major technological changes in developed countries have
found it useful to distinguish between what Enos (1962) refers to as the
alpha and beta stages. The former includes all efforts leading to and
including the introduction of a radically new technology. The latter covers
all of the subsequent minor technological changes undertaken to modify
and adapt it. In his own analysis of the development and diffusion of six
new petrochemical processes between 1913 and 1943, Enos found that the
cumulative reduction achieved in production cost per unit during the beta
stage was greater than the initial reduction obtained in the alpha state.
Studies show that other major technological changes have followed the
same pattern - the economic impact of replacing the old technology by
the new is generally less than the cumulative impact of gradual improve-
ments made afterwards.
From the standpoint of a developing economy, the assimilation of a
technology newly imported from abroad is a major technological change.
The initial transfer is parallel to Enos' alpha stage. The comparable beta
stage is the subsequent, gradual improvement in the productivity with
which the technology is used. The relative significance of the beta stage
for a developing economy's assimilation of a new technology appears to
be much greater than the analogy suggests, however. To introduce a
radically new technology into the world (as in Enos' alpha stage) requires
mastery of that technology; by contrast, to import a technology (as in
the technology transfer analogy) does not require mastery of it, at least
not at the outset. Rather, the case study research suggests that it is in the
beta stage that most of the increase in developing economies' tech-
nological mastery is achieved.
Only part of the impact of this increase is reflected in higher pro-
ductivity using the particular technology; much of the impact spills over
into related activities. For example, the mastery gained in assimilating one
technology enables greater indigenous participation in subsequent transfers
of related technologies, thereby increasing the effectiveness with which
they are assimilated. A number of semi-industrial economies have even
exploited their mastery to export technologies on a continually expanding
scale to other developing economies (Lall, chapter 8, this volume). In more
general terms, the increased mastery which results from experience with
previously established technologies contributes to an economy's capacity
to undertake independent technological efforts, including replication or
adaptation of foreign technologies as well as creation of new technologies.
Most of the technological changes so far uncovered can also be character-
ised as having been derived from plant-operating experience. Even within
the confines of an existing plant, production processes do not remain
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static, certainly not if the firm is able to prosper within a relatively com-
petitive environment. Production experience provides insight into how the
operation of a plant can be altered to improve its peformance. In
addition, circumstances vary constantly over the life of a plant: input
prices change, demand patterns shift, new competitors emerge and so on.
(The many possibilities for improving performance and reacting to chang-
ing circumstances can be appreciated by recalling that inputs and outputs
alike are highly differentiated in most industries.)
This process of capitalising on experience and reacting to varying
circumstances requires continued technological effort to modify existing
processes, which in turn represents an important source of increased
mastery in production engineering - the first category of technology
activity distinguished in the first section. Moreover this form of tech-
nological effort often extends to changing the basic design of a plant
when capacity is stretched or particular bottlenecks are broken. Thus it
can also be a source of mastery in project execution - the second category
in the typology provided above. Nevertheless, although the type of tech-
nological mastery acquired through plant operating experience may
overlap somewhat with that exemplified in project execution, the overlap
can never be complete.
To understand this point, it is worth listing the tasks involved in project
execution and considering the types of experience which are required to
perform them effectively. Project execution includes: 13
preinvestment technical and economic feasibility studies, using readily
available information to ascertain the viability of the project by examining
alternative product mixes, input sources and specifications, plant scales
and locations, and choices of production technology;
if viability is established, more detailed studies, using more specific
engineering norms obtained from prospective sources of technology, lead-
ing to tentative choices among the alternatives considered previously
and to refined estimates of capital requirements, personnel needs, cost
and mode of financing, construction timetable, and the like;
if viability is confirmed, basic engineering to supply the core process
technology, by establishing the process flow through the plant and the
associated material and energy balances (as well as designing specifications
and layouts for major items of equipment and machinery);
detailed engineering, to supply the peripheral technology, by providing
complete specifications of equipment and materials, detailed architectural
and civil engineering plans, construction specifications, installation specifi-
cations for all equipment, and so on;
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procurement, which includes the choice of equipment suppliers and
firms to construct and assemble the plant, coordination and control of
the various subscontractor's activities, and inspection of work in progress;
training of the plant's prospective personnel at all levels in various aspects
of the plant's operation and maintenance, often through experience
working temporarily in a similar plant elsewhere;
construction and assembly of the plant;
startup of operation, to attain predetermined project-specific norms and
to complete the provision of training in the plant's operation; and
trouble-shooting, to overcome the various design problems encountered
during the early part of the plant's life.
Mastery of almost all these tasks involves extensive 'learning by doing'.
Only for pre-investment feasibility studies does forrmal education alone
suffice to import the skills required. For the other tasks, the attainment
of technological mastery requires previous experience in the same or
closely related activities. Basic engineering, for example, calls for highly
specialised knowledge of the core processes, which can frequently be
acquired only through applied R&D, including pilot-plant experimentation.
Startup of operation often demands less familiarity with the principles
underlying the core processes, but entails knowledge that can come only
from previous production engineering experience in operating similar
plants. Post-startup trouble shooting calls for somewhat more knowledge
of the principles, but not necessarily as much as is involved in basic
engineering. Detailed studies (the second task in the sequence) do not
demand piecise knowledge of the industry. By contrast, many of the
individual detailed engineering tasks - for example, providing architectural
and civil engineering plans that conform to requirements determined in the
basic engineering stage - require no specialised knowledge whatsoever of
the particular industry, but instead require other forms of specialised
knowledge such as ability to design structures and civil works.
Production engineering and project execution are not the only broadly
defined uses of technological knowledge. Although they are not well in-
corporated into the existing research on technological change in developing
countries, the two other categories of activity distinguished in the first
section should not be overlooked. One is capital goods manufacture, which
consists of embodying technology in machines. The other is specialised
R&D to develop new products or processes."4 These activities have strong
links to production engineering and project execution, because to some
degree they are prompted and given direction by the problems and oppor-
tunities that arise in connection with production and investment. Indeed,
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the kinds of technological effort associated with production engineering
and project execution are frequently indistinguishable in concept from
those involved in R&D.15 Likewise, these efforts often involve changes
in the design of capital goods. Relatively little is known, however, about
capital goods producers and specialised R&D performers as initiators of
technological change, or about their roles in successful industrialisation.1 6
The rest of this paper therefore focuses on the achievement of mastery
in production engineering and project execution; the discussion con-
centrates on how the development of this mastery is affected by the ways
in which foreign technology is obtained, and by government policies
regarding technology transfers and industrial development.
RELIANCE UPON TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY
Theze are many means whereby less-developed economies can have access
to ioreign technological knowledge. Among them are various activities
in which foreigners play a passive role, with the subsequent translation
of this knowledge into technology being done indigenously. These activities
include sending nationals abroad for education, training, and work ex-
perience; consulting technical and other journals; copying foreign products
etc. As Korean experience indicates (see later dicussion), these kinds of
activities are tremendously important channels of information; almost
invariably, some of the technological knowledge underlying new industrial
initiatives in developing countries comes via one or other of them. By
contrast, transfers of technology constitute a crucially different class of
activities, in that the translation of technological knowledge into operational
form is made by foreigners.
Whether technology should be obtained locally or from abroad ought
to depend upon the relative costs and benefits to the recipient of acquir-
ing it from different sources. In this connection, the degree of local
mastery in the various uses of the underlying technological knowledge is
of critical importance. If little previous effort has been made to acquire
mastery of the specific technology, reliance upon domestic sources will
entail either the replication (and perhaps also the adaptation) of foreign
technology or the creation of new technology through indigenous effort.
Local development, however, is rarely the most effective way of initially
obtaining all of the necessary elements of a technology. More generally,
an economy's capacity to provide the various elements depends upon the
stage of development of the relevant sector and those closely related to it.
Firms starting up or already engaged in traditional or well-established
activities may often be able to acquire additional elements of technology
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relatively easily - either through their own developmental efforts or
through the diffusion of expertise from other domestic firms. The hiring
of personnel with previous work experience elsewhere plays an extremely
important part in the diffusion of expertise among firms, as does the
interchange of information among suppliers and users of individual pro-
ducts, especially in the case of intermediate products and capital goods.
Firms engaged in newly or recently initiated activities typically have much
less opportunity to take advantage of previous experience (if any), or of
diffusion or explicit transfers from other domestic firms.' 7 Firms in such
a position are likely to find it more cost-effective to rely heavily on foreign
suppliers of technology. Even in relatively highly developed sectors,
selective transfers from abroad may be equally cost effective aids to the
process of increasing productivity.
Transfers of technology take place in a large number of ways and often
incorporate not only the translation of technological knowledge into
information about operational processes but other elements as well.
Imports of machinery - an extremely important mode of technology
transfer - represent a case in point, in which the additional element is
the embodiment of the technology in hardware. Another example is
direct foreign investment when used as a means to acquire technology,
with the additional elements typically being financial capital, manage-
ment, and marketing.
Many modes of transfer do not involve explicit and separate payment
for transfer. This is frequently the case in the kinds of transactions in-
stanced above which incorporate additional elements, as it is with indirect
technology transfers. As an example of the latter, exporting firms often
receive valuable free technical assistance as a result of their dealings with
foreign buyers; in the conduct of their normal business operations, these
buyers frequently provide various forms of assistance in such areas as the
upgrading of product specifications and the achievement of improved
quality control (see the later description of Korea's experience).
Significant though they rnay be, indirect transfers have not received
much attention in past research. There has likewise been very little research
into the acquisition of foreign technological knowledge through activities
in which foreigners play a passive part. Information about these sources
of knowledge is hard to obtain while the problems associated with direct
transfers in which foreigners play an active part are more easily inferred.
Thus past research has concentrated on transfers made through trans-
actions for which a primary motivation is clearly to purchase technology.
Explicit transactions to transfer technology without any other elements
take many forms. Among the simplest forms of transaction are contracts
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for the services of individuals or consulting companies to provide individual
elements of technology (for example, to undertake specific design or
process engineering tasks, to give technical assistance during various
phases of the establishment and operation of a plant, or to provide tech-
nical information services). Other transactions include licensing and trade-
mark agreements which transfer particular proprietary product and process
designs.
The most all-inclusive form of transaction is a turnkey contract under
which a general contractor is hired to assume complete responsibility for
project execution, with the obligation to deliver an operating plant.
Transfers of technology embedded in direct foreign investment are some-
times accomplished through turnkey contracts given to independent
general contractors, but more often it is the foreign investor who acts
as the general contractor. Either way, with respect to the division of
labour between local and foreign technological effort, direct foreign
investment is usually indistinguishable from a turnkey contract. Turnkey
contracts, together with their counterpart in the form of direct foreign
investment, are perhaps the most frequent mode of transferring technology
for activities which are entirely new to an economy. Even if turnkey con-
tracts are not used, the scope and scale of technology transfers involving
the creation of a new industry are almost always greatest in the case of the
establishment of the first, or the first few, plants.
For policy-making purposes, there are two critical distinctions to be
made among the various forms of transactions to transfer technology. The
first is between transactions which simply transfer technological knowledge
and ones which incorporate other components as well. As we have indicated,
these other components sometimes include proprietary elements, such as
trademarks and brandnames; they may also involve transfers of capital,
management, and marketing. The significance of this distinction will be
indicated further below. The second distinction relates to whether the
transaction involves multiple elements of technology transfer.
The problem confronted in the more all-inclusive forms of technology
transfer is that tasks which could be performed locally are carried out
by foreigners. This can increase project costs, because the services could
have been provided more cheaply by local suppliers, and because intimate
knowledge of local conditions may be required to optimise plant design.
Moreover, failure to use qualified local suppliers precludes the possibility
of local accumulation of human capital through experience-based learning.
The economy is thereby deprived of experience that is directly relevant to
the industry's subsequent development. (It is also worth noting that
developing countries' inability to make effective use of such human
122 Carl Dablman and Larry Westphal
capital as they have acquired is a contributing factor to the loss of highly
trained local personnel through the 'brain drain'.)
In addition, turnkey contracts often deliver a plant together with
instructions for operating it under the conditions assumed in its design,
but fail to provide the recipient with an understanding of the full details
of how the plant operates or of why it operates as it does. This hampers
the recipient entity's ability to improve plant operating productivity or
to adapt to changes which may occur over time in the circumstances that
affect hr w the plant is best operated. As a result, the plant is likely to
operate at lower productivity than could optimally have been achieved
(with the entity probably also continuing to depend excessively upon
foreign mastery for technical assistance in troubleshooting); alternatively,
the entity will need to make greater efforts to achieve internal mastery
than would have been needed if more complete information had initially
been provided. These outcomes can be avoided by having the entity',
personnel participate in every phase of project execution, even if only as
intelligent observers who merely follow the work in progress and learn
which are the relevant questions in gaining mastery of the 'hows' and
'whys'. Some foreign technology suppliers may be unwilling to permit
such participation, however, for fear that it will transfer too much of
their technological mastery.
The crucial role of experience in acquiring technological mastery has
already been emphasised. Experience produces not only increased tech-
nological mastery but also greater productivity in supplying given elements
of technology. Unless carried out with the explicit objective of doing so,
technology transfers associated with project execution do not necessarily
provide the experience which is critical to the development of indigenous
technical and engineering services. For example, it has already been
suggested that conventional turnkey contracts are not intended to provide
mastery in any of the phases of project execution, and that they may fail
even to transfer an adequate understanding of production engineering.
In short, imports of technology need not transfer any of the tech-
nological mastery needed for the subsequent replacement of foreign by
local expertise.
Given this state of affairs, it may be asked whether domestic firms
have adequate incentives to take appropriate advantage of opportunities
to increase domestic mastery through experience in supplying technology
from local resources. Domestic firms may prefer to import technology
wvhen social objectives would dictate using local suppliers because of the
increased experience which the latter would gain. In turn, where iinports
are consistent with social objectives, domestic firms may prefer methods
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of technology transfer which do not adequately provide for the kinds of
local participation that would increase domestic technological mastery.
Even the simplest form of participation - intelligent observation - entails
a cost.
A rational firm seeking to acquire technology seeks to pay the lowest
possible price consistent with having the greatest possible assurance of
obtaining a technology which is reliable and well-suited to its circum-
stances. It is unlikely to use inexperienced local resources or to provide
for their participation unless it expects to gain a long-run benefit that
more than compensates for greater risks and/or higher costs in the short-
run. The social benefit of increased technological mastery, however,
generally exceeds the benefit which an individual firm can expect to
capture; there are many avenues by which technological mastery can
diffuse to other firms, and not all of these avenues are under the control of
the firm that finances the initial acquisition. In addition, the firm may
value the benefits that it does capture at less than their true social worth;
likewise, the cost of acquiring technological mastery as seen from the
firm's perspective may exceed the true social costs. Unless influenced by
some form of public intervention, a firm acting alone may therefore not
find it in its individual interest to take advantage of opportunities to
increase domestic technological mastery as much as social objectives
would dictate.18
The motives that underlie the packaging of multiple technological
elements and of various non-technological components witd.in a single
transaction are different but no less powerful. Participants on both sides
of the transaction benefit from packaging in so far as it increases their
respective net returns. Thus, to the extent that packaging lowers the tntal
cost of the undertaking, 19 and to the extent that the supplier and the
recipient share in the savings, each has an incentive to accept a compound
transaction. More than simply cost reduction may be involved, however,
particularly as regards the inclusion of non-technological components.
What ultimately enables certain suppliers to impose packaging is their
possession of some form of monopoly power, such as that conferred by
a well-known brandname. In such cases, the price paid for the package
necessarily includes a monopoly profit and can in that sense be con-
sidered 'excessive'. The principal motive behind the recipient's acceptance
of the package is typically the desire to acquire the same monopoly power,
at least within the domestic market. There is a convergence of interests
between the domestic firm and the foreign supplier to agree on a com-
pound transaction, since the domestic firm can offset the promise of
monopoly profits against the excessive price paid.
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Thus some compound transactions which transfer more than just
technology are not socially desirable even though they are clearly in
the interests of the domestic firms involved. That is, the motives which
give rise to technology imports can sometimes be at variance with social
objectives, because of the characteristics of the production which they
make possible and the monopoly power which they confer.
2 0 Moreover,
as indicated above,these motives can also be at variance with social object-
ives concerning the development of indigenous technical and engineering
services.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
Research on transfer of technology has shown that government inter-
vention can serve several important purposes, including the following:
to foster the choice of the most appropriate among alternative foreign
techniques; to obtain imports of technology on the best possible terms;
to avoid compound transactions which include components that are
socially undesirable; to promote, where appropriate, the use of local
suppliers rather than foreign sources; and to ensure, where technology is
imported, that the method of transfer provides for adequate local par-
ticipation designed to increase domestic technological mastery.
21 Some
of these aims can be achieved through defensive measures, such as pro-
tecting local suppliers from import competition. Others can only be
attained by taking positive steps, such as requiring local participation
so as to ensure adequate absorption of imported technology.
Governments of many developing countries have intervened in transfers
of technology, generally by imposing defensive measures to control the
terms on which transfers are made and to protect local suppliers. These
measures discriminate strongly against compound transactions and in
favour of single-element technology transfers. They also prohibit foreign
suppliers from imposing undesirable conditions - such as restrictions
on exports produced using the technology, or obligations to make avail-
able to the supplier arny improvements made in the technology. These
measures often have the explicit aim of offsetting the asymmetry that
exists in the relative bargaining strengths of foreign technology suppliers
and domestic recipients; they may also be complemented by various
forms of positive assistance in the negotiation process. The asymmetry
results in large measure fr(cm the very differences in technological know-
ledge and access to information that the transfer is meant - at least in
part - to remove. As a way of offsetting these differences, various govern-
ments also provide assistance to increase the knowledge available to
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technology-seeking firms. To promote the use of local suppliers, some
governments maintain registries which give information about suppliers'
capabilities. In a number of countries, local suppliers are protected by
requirements that the prospectii e importer provide evidence that the
desired technology cannot be obtained domestically.
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of these measures. Their proponents
assert that they have reduced expenditures on imported technology and
have helped to eliminate undesirable conditions without reducing the
inflow of desirable technology imports (see Stewart, 1981), It is unclear,
however, whether changes in the formal terms of transfer have been
counterbalanced by the addition of informal terms, or whether the im-
position of controls over formal terms has reduced the willingness of
foreigners to supply technology. Positive assistance to increase the tech-
nological knowledge available to domestic firms, and to enhance their
bargaining strength and negotiating ability, has undoubtedly had bene-
ficial results, but their extent is unknown. In turn, no systematic body of
evidence currently exists which could be used to assess the effects of
promoting the development of local technology suppliers, whether by
protection or by other means. Indeed, there is very little basis for judging
what role the government should appropriately play in the development
of local technological capacity.
To address this question, cross-country comparative evidence is needed
which shows how government policies have affected the achievement of
technological mastery, and how mastery of the various uses of technological
knowledge is related to the attainment of social objectives through indus-
trialisation. The research that comes closest to providing such evidence is
the Science and Technology Policy Instruments (STPI) project, the results
of which are summarised in Sagasti (1978).22 This project sought to
establish the comparative efficacy of different government policies aimed
at creating technological mastery. It focused on what were termed 'explicit'
policy instruments. These included the creation of technological infra-
structure through institution building; the establishment of science and
technology plans; promotion of the use of local technology suppliers;
the provision of fiscal incentives and direct subsidies to various kinds of
technological effort; the regulation of technology imports through measures
of the kind discussed above; and other public actions directly in support
of indigenous technological effort.
The central conclusion of the research was that explicit instruments had
far les; impact on technological change and the acquisition of technological
mastery than did other policies (for example, related to trade, credit
allocation, investment licensing, and the like) which affected industrial
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development more generally. 2 3 Explicit instruments did, however, appear
to assume increasing importance as industrial development progressed.
It is unclear why the explicit instruments were found to have relatively
little effect. It is possible that their ineffectiveness was a consequence of
another finding of the research, which was that these instruments tended
to be poorly implemented and often to work at cross-purposes. Thus, if
properly applied, explicit instruments might have a much greater impact.
It may equally be true, however, at least up to a certain stage of industrial
development, that what is most important is to gain mastery in production
engineering and project execution, that such mastery derives principally
from technological efforts related to the experience of industrial firms, and
that what matters most in this regard is the general climate for industrial
development. These possibilities were not explicitly considered at the
outset of the STPI project; consequently, they cannot be assessed on the
basis of the information gathered by it, though the project did include a
number of somewhat sketchy case studies that showed considerable tech-
nological effort at the firm level.
Other research, described in earlier sections of this paper, has found
that firms in developing countries acquire increased technological mastery
by engaging in purposive technological effort to assimilate and adapt
technology, an effort which typically takes place in relation to experience
gained in production engineering and project execution. These findings,
cannot, however, be taken to show that experience necessarily leads to
greater technological mastery and thereby to beneficial technological
changes. Whether experience produces such results depends crucially on
the extent and character of purposive effort to capitalise uoon it, and this
effort is by no means automaticclly forthcoming. Whether and in what
directions the effort takes place depends - at least in part - on the com-
bined impact of a wide variety of incenicive policies which condition the
climate for industrial development. Moreover, it is by no means certain
that the technological changes which follow from ruch effort are always
consistent with sociaJ objecti-ves, or that sufficient eff-ort will be forth-
coming in all appropriate directions. Discussion of this last point is deferred
to the concluding section.
KOREAN TECHNOLOGICAL MASTERY
Historical evidence forms the principal basis for considering how tech-
nological mastery might appropriately evolve in relation to industrial
development. The Republic of Korea - often referre:d to as South Korea
and in this Chapter simply as Korea - provides an instructive example. The
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broad outlines of Korea's remarkably successful achievement of semi-
industrial status are well kno and need not be repeated here. Less
well known are what Korea's technological mastery consists of and how
it was acquired. Available evidence on these points is summarised below
for the period from the end of the Korean War until approximately
1978.'
The fundaniental elements of Korea's industrialisation have been
directed and controlled by nationals. Foreign resources have made sub-
stantial contributions, but the transactions involved have typically been at
arm's length. Thus, although Korea has relied quite heavily on capital
inflows, these have overwhelmingly been in the form of debt, not equity,
and technology has been acquired from abroad largely through means
other than direct foreign investment. The purchase of technology through
licensing agreements has been of modest importance as the initial source
of process technology. Machinery imports and turnkey contracts hav-
been of much greater consequence in the transfer of technology, and a
tremendous amount of expertise has been obtained as a result of the
return of Koreans from study or work abroad. Moreover, in only a few
sectors, such as electronics, have Korean exports depended critically upon
transactions between related affiliates of multinational corporations or
upon international subcontracting.2 5
Korea's success in assimilating technologies acquired through arm's-
length transactions is in part explained by the nature of technology and
product differentiation in the industries on which its growth has crucially
depended. Many of these industries - such as plywood or textiles and
apparel - use relatively mature technologies; in such cases, mastery of
well-established and conventional methods, embodied in equipment
readily available from foreign suppliers, is sufficient to permit efficient
production.2 6 The products of many of these industries are either quite
highly standardised (plywood, for example) or differentiated in tech-
nologically minor respects and not greatiy dependent on brand recog-
nition for purchaser acceptance (textiles and apparel, for example). Thus,
in most of the industries that have been intensively developed, few advan-
tages are to be gained from licensing or direct foreign investment as far
as technology acquisition and overseas marketing are concerned.
None the less, exceptions exist, of which electronics is perhaps the most
notable. This is an industry in which technology is changing rapidly world-
wide, product differentiation is based on. sophisticated technological
expertise, and purchasers' brand preferences are evident. Given these
characteristics, it is not surprising to find that in this case Korea flas relied
extensively on direct foreign investment to establish production, particularly
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for export, and has so far failee, to gain local mastery of many key aspects
of production engineering. It should be noted, however, that the electronics
and certain chemicals industries are unique in Korea in their almost
exclusive reliance on direct foreign investment for acquirinlg the very
latest technology and market access.
In. other industries, where technology is similarly proprietary, a number
of examples attest to the fact that Korean industry has managed to initiate,
and in most cases to operate successfully, a variety of 'high-technology'
industrial activities by means of licensing and turnkey arrangements. To
cite two cases: Korea used arrangements of this kind to acquire the most
modern shipbuilding technology in the world, and to incorporate the most
recent technological advances in its integrated steel mill.
More generally, Korea's recent experience in promoting technologically
sophisticated industries indicates that their development may involve
greater reliance on licensing as a way of acquiring technology. This is not
a mattrr of absolutes, however; it remains possible to substitute for
licenr,i. g by replicating foreign technology through local effort. The
difference is simply that the cost of doing so is higher in the industries
which have been promoted in more recent years. It is unclear, however,
whether overseas firms will be willing to license technology without
restricting its use. They may impose restrictions on the sales of licensed
products, prefer to give access to technology only through direct foreign
investment, or even deny access. It is equally unclear whether the shift
also implies greater dependence on licensing and direct foreign invest-
ment for access to overseas markets, if only to gain rapid consumer
acceptance throughi the use of familiar brand names.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Korea's past strategy for
gaining technological mastery has relied heavily on indigenous effort
through capitalising on experience and emphasiring the selective use of
foreign resources, In industries for which proces, technology is not product-
specific, the initial achievement of mast&e-y has frequently permitted the
copying of foreign products as a means of enlarging technological capacity.
The mechanical engineering industries, among others, afford many
examples; such processes as machining and casting, once learned by pro-
ducing one itein, can readily be applied in the production of others. One
case which has been closely studied is textile machinery, in particular
semi-automatic looms for weaving fabric (Rhee and Westphal, 1977). In
this as in some other cases, Korean manufacturers have not only been
able to produce a capital good that meets world standards, albeit of an
older vintage; they have, in addition, adapted the product design to make
it more appropriate to Korean circumstances. (The adapted semi-automatic
Technological Effort in Industrial Development - A Survey 129
looms fall between ordinary semi-automatic and fully automatic looms
in terms of the labour intensity of the weaving technology they embody.)
In other industries in which technology is more product-specific, such as
chemicals, mastery of the underlying principles has permitted greater
local participation in the subsequent establishment of closely allied lines
of production.
Export activity has proved to be a very important means of acquiring
technological mastery. As a result of exporting, Korean firms have enjoyed
virtually costless access to a tremendous range of information, diffused to
them in various ways by the buyers of their exports. The resulting minor
technological changes have significantly increased production efficiency,
changed product designs, upgraded quality, and improved management
practices. Exporting thus appears to have offered a direct means of
improving productivity, in addition to the indirect stimulus derived from
trying to maintain and increase penetration in overseas markets. This bene-
ficial externality of export activity has gone largely unnoticed in the
literature on trade and development. The Korean experience indicates that
it is very real, and further suggests that it may in part explain why countries
following an export-led strategy have experienced such remarkable success
in their industrialisation efforts.
Furthermore, the fast pace of Korea's industrial growth has permitted
rapid rates of technological learning because of the short intervals between
the construction of successive plants in many industries. In some industries,
including synthetic resins and fibres, the first plants were often built on a
turnkey basis and on a scale which was much smaller either than that
warranted by the size of the market or that which would exhaust scale
economies. Construction of the second and subsequent plants -- at scales
much closer or equal to world scale 27 - followed quickly, with Korean
engineers and technicians assuming a gradually increasing role in project
execution. To this extent, Korea's technological mastery in these industries
can be said to extend beyond production engineering to project execution.
Korea's experience demonstrates that indigenous entrepreneurs can be
relied upon to identify profitable ventures, to exercise selectivity in the
use of foreign resources, including technology transfers, and to manage
industrial undertakings. But Korea's entrepreneurial talent has not been
deployed in industry alone; government also has benefited. F deed, Korea's
remarkably successful industrialisation would not have occurred if the
government had not designed and implemented effective policies to foster
industrial dynamism.
Korea's experience further demonstrates that a high level of tech-
nological mastery in all aspects of the uses of technological knowledge
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is not required for sustained industrial development. This is evident from
the fact that its mastery has progressed much further in production
engineering than in project execution. In addition, Korea has relied on
foreign suppliers for necessary capital equipment and has only recently
embarked on a concerted programme of import substitution in the capital-
goods sector. None the less, Korean industry has acquired and exercised
the capacity to choose the technologies to be imported, and Koreans have
become increasingly involved in other phases of project execution. Funda-
mentally, however, Korea has become a significant industrial power mainly
as a result of its proficiency in production. It thus appears that mastery of
production engineering alone is nearly sufficient for the attainment of an
advanced stage of industrial development,
Contemporary pronouncements about the nature of, and the constraints
imposed by, the existing international economic order are contradicted by
Korea's experience. In the context of calls for a 'new international
economic order', it is frequently alleged that existing international markets
are non-competitive, and that developing countries are either denied
access to technology and overseas markets or are granted it only on highly
unfavourable terms. It is further asserted that foreigners exercise the
initiative in transfers of technology and in the organisation of export
activity. If true, these assertions would imply a severe constraint on
industrial development. Far from supporting them, Korea's experience
shows them to be false for many important industries.
To summarise, in the process of its industrialisation, Korea has effectively
assimilated various elements of foreign technology, but without much
direct foreign participation in its industrial sector. Assimilation was
achieved through a succession of technological efforts over time, largely
undertaken by domestic firms to extend their technological mastery and
to accomplish minor technological changes. Korea's experience supports
the argument that indigenous effort is of overriding importance in the
achievement of technological mastery, but the causal forces that con-
tribute both to the presence and to the effectiveness of indigenous effort
have yet to be uncovered.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has stressed the role of technological effort in relation to
production engineering and project execution as a source of technological
mastery. Such effort involves not only assimilation but also adaptation of
technology. Foreign and indigenous technologies alike can be adapted in
numerous ways to make them better suited to local circurrmstances. This
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fact gives rise to an important question: is the technological effort which
takes place sufficient to ensure that all socially warranted adaptations are
made? 28
As indicated in the earlier dicussion, it is clear that individual firms
sometimes undertake technological efforts which are inconsistent with
social objectives and conversely that they often do not have sufficient
incentives to undertake socially warranted technological efforts. Though it
is only one of many determinants, market structure exerts a strong in-
fluence on the extent and direction of technological effort. Socially waste-
ful effort tends to be associated with either the exercise or the pursuit of
monopoly power. By contrast, producers in highly competitive industries
are unlikely to engage in enough technological effort; uncertainty, in-
divisibilities in the effort required, and inability to appropriate the full
benefits all contribute to the latter result (Arrow, 1962).
Government intervention designed to promote socially warranted
adaptations can take many forms. Producing firms can be encouraged by
subsidies or other means either to undertake technological efforts directly
or to contract for them. In addition, the development of specialised agents
of technological change can be promoted. In following the latter approach,
the governments of a number of less-developed economies have con-
centrated on establishing publicly-supported R&D institutes to undertake
scientific and technological research. Underlying the creation of many
of these institutions was the belief that technological change is a linear
process which starts with R&D and proceeds by stages automatically to
commercial application, with at least the initial stages being quite distinct
and easily separable from production activity. R&D institutes were expected
to be able readily to identify where their services would have the greatest
payoff and to generate the requisite technological changes. Subsequent
empirical evidence has shown that the initial faith in the efficacy of
creating specialised R&D agents was misplaced, as the newly established
R&D institutes almost universally had virtually no contact with or impact
upon producing firms.29
The adaptation (and creation) of technology cannot be separated
from its use. Warranted adaptations must first be identified before they
can be implemented. To identify them requires experience-based
familiarity with both the technology and local circumstances. Moreover,
warranted adaptations emerge in scquential fashion over time, as more
is learned and as local circumstances change. Foreign entities are not
well placed either to gain the necessary degree of familiarity with changing
local circumstances or to make continued use of such familiarity as they
may possess. Hence indigenous entities which are able to adapt tech-
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nologies can be expected to play an important role in the process of
industrialisation.
To what extent should or must this role be played by specialised
agents of technological change? The past failings of R&D institutes not-
withstanding, particular circumstances can providc a strong rationale for
their establishment, as long as their activities are properly linked with
those of producing firms. For example, centralised publicly-supported
R&D may be warranted to adapt traditional indigenous technologies
employed in highly competitive industries characterised by small-scale
production. Such technologies may not continue to be viable unless
adapted, and properly adapted they may be better suited to local circum-
stances than are competing foreign technologies. A general case can also be
made for publicly-supported promotion of the local production of capital
goods, since there appear to be many socially warranted adaptations which
cannot be accomplished without some degree of local mastery in the
embodiment of technology in capital goods.30
Among the manufacturing sectors of the industrially advanced econ-,
omies, R&D activity is concentrated not only in the industries that pro-
duce capital goods but also in those that produce the major intermediate
inputs (chemicals, fabricated materials) used elsewhere. Underlying this
pattern of specialisation are close relationships involving frequent in-
formation interchanges between the suppliers and users of producers'
goods. This suggests that it may not be enough for developing economies'
governments to rely solely on explicitly targeted policies to correct for
differences between private and social returns to the development of dif-
ferent types of technological mastery. Government action may also be
reouired to promote and maintain an environment conducive to decen-
tralised technological effort, together with a market structure in which
technological changes are rapidly diffused. Furthermore, it must not be
forgotten that the acquisition of technological mastery is an element of
a country's human cspital development - although the implications of
this fact for government inroolvement in formal education and experience-
based skill acquisition lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, the dependence of an economy's fund of technological exper-
tise on the mastery of previously introduced technologies has important
implications. It means that initial decisions about choices of techrnology
and degrees of local involvement in investments to implement them are
critical determinants of the directions in which an economy's techno-
logical mastery will develop. Although the empirical evidence derived
from research is not yet comprehensive enough to provide a clear basis on
which to make prescriptions about how an economy's technological
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mastery ought to evolve in relation to its industrial development, it seems
clear that a synergistic relationship can develop between them, with
advances in each prompting new gains in the other. As Korean experience
demonstrates, however, high indigenous levels of all types of technological
mastery are not necessary for the initial stages of industrial development;
in the Korean case, a mastery which has been mainly confined to production
engineering has been sufficient. The Korean example also suggests that by
relying on foreign sources of technology, it is possible to choose a tech-
nology without having first mastered its use. In the same way, it is also
possible to use a technology without having the mastery required to
reDlicate it through project execution, or to manufacture the capital
goods involved.
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that, just as the initial choice of
production method may greatly constrain the direction of technical
change, so the kinds of technological effort in which an economy acquires
experience may constrain the type of technological mastery which it can
develop. Furthermore, there is an important difference between attaining
mastery in relation to given circumstances and in attaining the capacity to
adapt to changing circumstances. The objective of acquiring technological
mastery is not simply to produce in the present; it is equally to be able to
adapt technology and to anticipate changes in world and domestic markets.
Thus it is also necessary to develop the capacity to innovate in various
respects. It is unclear how far this capacity can be developed solely on the
basis of production engineering or project execution experience.
The effects of different policies on the development of indigenous
technological mastery have yet to be ascertained. Further research to un-
cover historical evidence from different country cases is necessary to reach
any soundly-based generalisations about the determinants of the extent
and appropriateness of technological effort in different directions. Such
generalisations are needed to formulate policies that will direct the attain-
ment of increased technological mastery in ways which are in line with
social objectives.
NOTES
1 Under this narrow definition, a firm or an economy could have a great deal of
technological mastery and yet not deploy it effectively, owing to inappropriate
organisational or procedural factors.
2 Nelson (1980) provides an illuminatinfz dAiscussion that relates the possibility
of specialisation in the acquisition of .. cw technological knowledge to the
feasibility of codifying technology.
3 Up-to-date foreign technology is frequently the appropriate choice in activities
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that are inherently capital-intensive, such as the core processes of chemical
fertiliser production. Assuming that the products involved should be pro-
duced rather than imported, employment generation can be said to suffer
from the use of foreign technology in these activities only in the sense that it
would be prefertble if efficient and more highly labouir-intensive alternatives
existed.
4 'Efficient' has a very definite meaning in this context. An efficient technique, or
combination of inputs, is one that uses less of at least one input than is used by
any alternative technique to produce a given level of output. A technique may
be efficient at some, but not at other, levels of output.
5 The principal centres for this research have been the World Employment Pro-
gram of the International Labor Organization, the David Livingston Institute
of Overseas Development at the University of Strathclyde in Great Britain,
and the Economic Growth Center at Yale University in the United States,
though important research has also been carried out by numerous individuals
having various institutional affiliations. See Westphal (1978) for a policy-
focussed survey and list of references.
6 See Pack (1980) for a succinct compilation of the evidence from a number of
industry studies.
7 For a discussion of the difficulties associated with the employment of used
equipment, see Cooper and Kaplinsky (1974), where means of circumventing
these difficulties are also discussed.
8 The argument is not necessarily valid, since the frequency of breakage can be
reduced by using more expensive yarn having greater uniformity and strength.
Alternatively, depending upon relative input costs, it may be economical to
employ the labour intensive technique and to suffer higher rejection rates,
thus using more yarn to produce the same amount of acceptable product in
order to save on capital costs.
9 See Stewart (1982). As she indicates, a realistic conception of technological
mastery has yet to be incorporated in a theory of dynamic comparative advan-
tage.
10 'i he largest block of case-study research has been carried out under the auspices
of the Regional Program of Studies on Scientific and Technical Development in
Latin America, jointly sponsored by the Inter-Arnerican Development Bank, the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, the United Nations
Development Program, and the International Development Research Center in
Canada, and under the direction of Jorge Katz. See Katz (1978) for a summary
of the research so far.
11 For an in-depth case study, and a highly illuminating discussion of why tech-
nological effort is not automatically or necessarily forthcoming, see Bell, et al.
chapter 7, thii. volume. For evidence across firms in the same sector in one
country, and an equally illuminating discussion, see Pearson (1977).
12 The reference here is to technological changes that occur after the achievement
of predetermined project-specific norms (e.g. the nominal capacity rating).
Baloff (1966) discusses what is entailed in achieving these norms.
13 Note that several of these tasks pertain to choice of technology, which is a
fundamental element of project execution.
14 several cases of the development of new products or processes through R&D
htve been observed in research in progress at the World Bank to investigate the
t( chnological mastery which underlies exports of technology by Brazil and
Mexico. It is important to note, however, that in most of these cases, the R&D
wts undertaken within producing enterprises, and not by independent in-
st itutions.
15 These efforts have typically been found to take place in various production-
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oriented departments within firms and engineering companies. Only occasionally
have they occurred in separate R&D departments.
16 References to surveys of what is known appear on pp. 130-3.
17 The opportunity is least when new process technologies must be mastered. It is
much greater if the new activity simply involves applying known process tech-
nologies to the production of a new product.
18 See Cooper (1981) for a survey of the various issues involved here.
19 Packaging can reduce costs in numerous ways. Here only a few examples are
given. Combining long-term contracts to supply key intermediate inputs to-
gether with the supply of core process technology lowers the cost of supplying
the latter in cases where the supplier's technological mastery is related very
specifically to the use of particular inputs. In turn, the motive for including
multiple technological elements, as in a turnkey contract, is sometimes to give
the supplier greater control over the transfer in order to minimise the risk of
cost overruns. Alternatively, the motive may be to avoid the costs of coordinat-
ing with other suppliers. These costs can be quite high, especially when the
other suppliers are local companies which may be unfamiliar with standard
procedures. There may also be other barriers to communication to overcome
when local companies are involved..
20 Product differentiation is frequently the origin of the monopoly power that is
packaged with technology transfer. Differentiation may reflect very substantial
differences in important dimensions of technological mastery or very trivial
ones. Whether particular forms of foreign-induced product differentiation are
at variance with social objectives is a matter for public authorities to determine
and to act upon through appropriate incentive and control measures, But
acceptance of some forms of product differentiation is undoubtedly desirable,
since no one specification of a product's characteristics is equally suited to all
of its uses.
21 The principal centres for research on technology transfer have been - from the
outset - the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex in Great
Britain - and subsequently - the secretariat of the Andean Pact, the Organ-
ization of American States, the United Nations Commission on Trade and
Development, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
Research on the behaviour of multinational corporations also often focuses on
technology transfer issues. Such research has been conducted by the United
Nations Center on Transnational Corporations and by various faculty members
of the Harvard Business School, among others. See Stewart (1981) for a com-
prehensive policy-focussed survey and list of references.
22 Ten developing economies were included in the project, which was sponsored
by the International Development Research Center in Canada.
23 Sagasti (1978) is quite vague about how these other policies affect technological
change and the acquisition of technological mastery. Moreover, the project did
not attempt to determine whether different development strategies (e.g. inward-
versus outward-looking) have distinct, identifiable effects. The case studies of
Latin American firms (see pp. 113-19) and Korean experience (see pp.126-30)
suggest that they might.
24 The following discussion is based on detailed evidence given in Westphal, et al.
(1979).
25 International subcontracting refers to export activity that is wholly organised
by an overseas firm; the domestic, exporting firm is responsible only for over-
seeing production.
26 This does not imply the absence of rapid technological change in the industry
in developed countries. It simply means that developing countries can - at least
for a while - maintain a comparative advantage, once established, based on
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mastery of conventional methods more appropriate to their factor endow-
ments.
27 The observed pattern of time-phased plant construction in these industries
might be an optimal strategy, with small scales chosen for the first plants to
minirnise the costs and risks entailed in learning thc technology. It is not known,
however, whether these or other considerations were the controlling ones at the
time the first plants were constructed.
28 A particular adaptation is warranted only if the benefits to be achieved can
reasonably be expected to repay the costs of the technological effort involved
in undertaking it, with benefits and costs being measured in relation to social
objectives.
29 See Crane (1977) for a comprehensive review of the evidence.
30 See Pack (1981) for a survey of what is known about the role of the capital
goods sector both as an agent of technological change and in relation to indus-
trialisation more generally.
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